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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose

spread health care risk over a
broad population in order to reduce the financial burden an individual
faces in the case of illness accident. When grouped together for this
of health insurance

is

to

purpose, however, seniors represent a high-risk population. Elders are
more like; than others to need health care services yet less likely to have

adequate financial resources.

The Medicare Program began

in

1965 as a partial response to the

income and health factors that limit the success of traditional health
insurance for the elderly population. This federal program, however, does
the health care costs or health care services needed by
Medicare Supplemental Insurance, or Medigap, developed to

not cover
seniors.

all

fill

the "gaps" in federal coverage.

Medigap insurers are regulated by the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance. There are four benefit packages that
govern the structure of all nongroup products available in the state, and
consumer protections guard seniors from some marketing abuses.
Medigap policies cover a range of Medicare deductibles and co-payments
as well as additional benefits, for some packages, such as prescription
drugs. Medicare and Medigap together, however, still do not cover all
necessary health care expenses, most notably long-term care.
In Massachusetts,

As the only insurer in Massachusetts required to offer Medigap
insurance, Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BC/BS) has historically been the
major provider of Medigap coverage in the state. The products offered
through BC/BS under the brand name of Medex are subject to more
regulation than those of either commercial insurers or Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), which offer contracts for Medicare beneficiaries.
BC/BS must provide all seniors with the opportunity to buy Medicare
Supplemental Insurance.
However,

rising health care costs

competitiveness of

combined with the declining

BC/BS are producing Medex premiums

so costly that

they block access to health care for growing numbers of low- and middle-

income seniors. The national medical care inflation rate from 1980 to 1990
was 115%, about twice as high as regular inflation. Prescription drug
costs are rising at even faster rates, accounting for about 40% of Medex
premium increases in recent years. Additionally, from 1985 to 1989, the

BC/BS rose significantly faster than claims.
Certain changes in the health insurance industry have reduced the ability
of BC/BS to generate reserves which in the past have offset their losses in
administrative costs of

Medex

products.

From 1980 to 1990, premium rates for three Medigap plans offered
through BC/BS -- Medex 2, Medex 3, and Standard -- rose 210%, 298%,
and 409% respectively. During that same period, Social Security Cost of
Living Adjustments increased only

Medicare Program
medical

bills,

52%. Twenty-five years

after the

began to offer elders some relief from their
Massachusetts seniors today are spending more of their
first

income on health care

costs.

Growing numbers

of seniors are unable to afford

Medex premiums

and, regardless of whether they need health care services, are dropping or
downgrading their coverage. While there was a rapid initial growth in

HMO

coverage for Medicare beneficiaries, enrollment has slowed in recent
years. And, rather than assuming coverage responsibility for a share of
high-risk seniors, HMOs on average have been insuring younger, healthier
seniors, leaving the "Blues" to cover seniors with more expensive health
care needs. While HMOs were once thought to provide at least a partial

Medigap insurance, rising health care costs and
inadequate federal reimbursement levels are beginning to raise doubts.

solution to the crisis in

In 1990 alone, close to 40,000 seniors either dropped or

downgraded

their nongroup BC/BS supplemental coverage. The rising rates are
causing some seniors to assume the health and financial risk of being
underinsured. Less healthy seniors with inadequate coverage are choosing
between foregoing necessary medical care or shouldering huge out-of-

pocket costs.
Rising premiums and declining enrollment have given rise to a
of initiatives on the federal and state levels designed to address

number

both the immediate need for Medigap relief and also the long-term
questions of Medigap reform. These bills struggle to incorporate premium
reduction and premium subsidization strategies into the current health
care system. Each of the proposed solutions, however, brings with it
political or practical barriers for full and effective implementation.
In this report, we investigate in detail the cost and enrollment
trends in Medigap insurance, particularly in the products of BC/BS, which

We

some
of the proposed solutions currently being debated on the national and state
levels and analyze the impact they may have on the immediate crisis and
long-term problems of Medigap insurance in Massachusetts.
give evidence of the crisis situation facing elders today.

critique

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of health insurance is to spread risk The system
works under the assumption that, at any given point in time, only a
percentage of the people in a given group will be sick. Regardless of
health status, all members of the group will be paying premiums in order
to cover the cost of care for those who need it.
As a group, however, seniors represent a high-risk population. They
are more likely than younger people to need health care services and tend
to require longer hospital stays.

Yet, while their expenses are greater,

their financial resources are generally

more

limited.

Seniors are falling

victim to their double vulnerability in the areas of health

and income.

As the only insurer in Massachusetts required to offer Medicare
Supplemental Insurance (Medigap), Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BC/BS)
has historically been the major provider of such coverage. Today, however,
rising health care costs combined with the declining competitiveness of
BC/BS are producing expensive Medigap premiums that many people
cannot afford. Growing numbers of Massachusetts' elders are without
adequate health care coverage.
In 1990 alone, close to 40,000 Massachusetts seniors either dropped
or downgraded their nongroup BC/BS supplemental coverage. The rising

premium

rates are causing

some

assume the health and
Other seniors with inadequate
choose between foregoing necessary medical
seniors to

financial risk of being underinsured.

coverage are being forced to

care or shouldering huge out-of-pocket costs.

we

and enrollment trends in
Medigap insurance over the past ten years, particularly those in BC/BS,
and identify some of the systemic problems of Medigap in the context of
the Massachusetts insurance market. Finally, we look at some possible
directions for Medigap insurance reform.
In this report,

investigate the cost

THE BASICS
In order to create a foundation on which to build a better
understanding of the systemic problems in Medicare supplemental

insurance, we begin this report by examining the basics.
section, we answer the following four questions:

What is Medigap insurance?
What does Medigap insurance

o
o
o
o

What

is

coyer?

Who provides Medigap insurance?
How is Medigap insurance regulated?

After answering these questions,
situation

In this

and move forward

we look

at evidence of a crisis

to suggest directions for reform.

Medigap insurance?

Medigap insurance

is

health insurance, offered by various private

insurers, which supplements the federal

The Medicare Program

Medicare Program.

a health insurance program that pays for
a portion of specified medical services for people over 65 as well as certain
is

a program of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services and is administered by the Health Care
Financing Administration. The Medicare Program began in 1965 under
President Johnson, at a time when elders were spending an average of 15%
disabled individuals.

It is

of their income on health-related costs.

The Medicare Program
o

divided in two parts:

Part

A

and Part

B.

Part A generally covers inpatient hospital costs. It is funded
through a portion of the 7.65% Social Security payroll tax on
both employers and employees. For most people there is no
individual

o

is

Part

B

premium

covers

80%

for Part A.

of physicians' and other outpatient

Twenty-five percent of the funding for Part

bills.

B comes from
B

premiums paid by Medicare
premiums were $29.90 per month. The remaining funds
Part B come from federal general revenue.
recipients.

In 1991, Part

for

This federal program, however, does not cover all the services or all
the costs associated with the health care needs of Medicare recipients.
Routine services including physicals and tests for vision and hearing are
not covered by the Medicare Program.

Outpatient prescription drugs are
Long-term care costs such as nursing home charges and
extended home care are not covered, except under very limited
not covered.

circumstances.
Additionally, both Medicare Part

minimum

A and

Part

B have

deductibles, or

out-of-pocket costs, which must be incurred by the enrollee

before the benefits of the program begin. Currently, the first-day hospital
deductible under Part A is $628 and the Part B deductible is $100.

Hospital co-payments (which range from $148 per day after the 60th day
to full payment after the 150th day) and 20% Part B coinsurance are also
the responsibility of the Medicare beneficiary.

In order to address the

many

expensive "gaps" in Medicare

coverage, supplemental insurance products designed for individuals

Program have been developed.
Medicare supplemental products are referred

enrolled in both parts of the Medicare
Collectively, the various

to

as "Medigap" insurance.

What

does Medigap insurance cover?

Medigap insurance generally covers some combination of Medicare
deductibles, hospital co-payments, and Part B coinsurance. Certain
policies

may

also include coverage for prescription drugs,

care, preventive care,

and excess

Excess doctors' charges occur when physicians

more than the amount approved by Medicare
Medicare pays only 80% of

its

home

health

doctors' charges.

bill

Medicare for

for given procedures.

a pproved amount, leaving the beneficiary

20% Part B coinsurance plus all of the cost above the approved
amount. In Massachusetts, physicians are prohibited from charging and
collecting more than the Medicare approved amount. This prohibition is
referred to as the "ban on balance billing." In other words, the patient is
not liable for the balance of the bill, or the amount beyond the approved

with the

charge.

Because there are hundreds of different Medigap policies offered
across the country, there is no simple answer to the question of what
Medigap covers. To address this confusion, Congress in 1990 ordered the
standardization of Medigap policies.

In response, the National

Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) tentatively approved
10
standardized benefit packages. According to the NAIC, all of these
policies include a set of "basic benefits'' which consist of payment of the
20^ Part B coinsurance and the hospital co-payments for the 61st to 90th
days.

Unlike most state regulators, however, the Massachusetts Division
of Insurance already controls the benefit content of the nongroup Medigap

Only four nongroup

policies sold in the state.

can be sold

in

(see p. 5) benefit

packages
Massachusetts. The basic benefits of each of these plans

are shown in the table below:

Massachusetts Medigap Packages

PLAN

BENEFIT

*

Standard

*

PLAN

3

PLAN

Medex

3

* Basic

2

Medex

2

•

Hospital Deductible

No

Yes

Yes

No

Hospital Co-payments

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Part B Deductible

No

Yes

Yes

No

Part B Coinsurance

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NONE

Excess Doctors' Charges

MASS

IN

Home

Health Care

Prescription Drugs

No
100%

80%

•

PLAN

1

generic,

NONE
IN

MASS

NONE
MASS

IN

No

No

No

100%

80%

brand;

4

NONE
MASS

IN

No
generic,

brand;

100%

80%

generic,

brand;

$35 /quarter

$35 /quarter

$250/year

deductible

deductible

deductible

Mail -Order Prescription
Drugs

$2.00 generic;
$10.00 brand

No

$2.00 generic;
$10.00 brand

$2.00 generic;
$10.00 brand

Preventive Care

No

No

No

No

Corresponding Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans
Source:

Massachusetts

Division of Insurance

important to remember that no Medigap policy covers all of
the gaps in the Medicare Program (for example, almost none cover longterm care expenses) and that Medigap will not pay anything for medical
services denied by Medicare.
It is

,

.

,

^oAAirv,

^aAActcAaAe//^ 02425-3393
June 1992

Dear Colleague,
The enclosed report, Medicare Supplemental Insurance:
Today's Crisis, provides important data that explains the crisis
situation in which elders are struggling to pay tor necessary
health insurance. For those attempting to provide solutions to
this problem, it also discusses reforms.

From 1980 to 1990, the cost of Medex 3, the most popular
supplemental policy in Massachusetts, has increased almost 300
percent. During the same period, Social Security cost-of-living
increases have amounted to only 52 percent. Not surprisingly,
during this same period, there has been an increase in seniors
reducing or dropping their supplemental coverage.
It is our hope that this report will provide useful
information concerning the extent of the problem, and encourage
lawmakers, advocates, and policymakers to seek appropriate
solut ions

We welcome any comments that you may have regarding this
publication. Additional copies are available upon request from
the Gerontology Institute.

Very truly yours,

L^A&

S^ott A. Bass, Ph.D.
Director
Gerontology Institute

Enclosure
EAB/lo

fc>^L
Ellen A. Bruce, J.D.
Director
Public Policv Division
Gerontology Institute

Who

provides Medigap insurance?

There are two basic types of private Medigap coverage: traditional
fee-for-service plans and Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans.
Fee-for-service plans, also

known

as indemnity plans, include the

BC/BS and commercial

majority of plans offered by

insurers. Under these
and physicians each time an enrollee receives
medical care. In contrast, an HMO is a provider/insurer system which
agrees to manage the care of an enrollee. For a fixed premium, an HMO
provides medical services through a specified set of doctors and hospitals
that cover a defined geographic area. The network of providers is known

plans, insurers pay hospitals

as the delivery system.

Elders may be insured either under group plans or nongroup plans.
Group plans are available to seniors through a past or current employer

or union or through a member-based organization, such as the American
Association for Retired Persons (AARP). Nongroup or individual plans
are directly established between seniors and insurers.
In 1990,

BC/BS and

the Massachusetts Division of Insurance

ndertook a joint project to look at the decline in BC/BS's ability to
compete in the insurance market. The resulting Cresap-Tillinghast report
•

indicated that

75%

of the Medicare-eligible population in the state in 1988

had Medigap coverage.

Medigap Coverage
o joy© were covered Dy
BC/BS non-group coverage;

in

Massachusetts
BC/f3S

Uninsured/

_-*! -

::|

~~

--^Nongr 3Up

Medicaid^-::::::::

o 18% were covered by
commercial insurers;

o 13% were covered by
BC/BS group plans; and
o

8%

were covered by

VjHMM^fflElMJ^^^^J J
Commercial ^^m^ma^^-— bc/bs Gr oup

HMOs

HMOs.

Source:

Cresap-Tillinghast

Insurers

Analysis,

1990

Most of the remaining 25% either had no Medigap coverage or received
Medigap coverage through Medicaid, the federal/state health care
program for the poor.
their

Blue Cross and Blue Shield The most popular Medigap policies
are offered through BC/BS under the brand name of Medex. Both
nongroup and group plans are available. These Medigap policies offer
relatively comprehensive benefits, and all Medicare-eligible residents of the

Commonwealth who

are enrolled in Medicare Part A and Part B are
guaranteed the opportunity to buy coverage. Because BC/BS insures many
people who have expensive needs, the growing cost of this coverage is
forcing many people to drop or downgrade their Medex policy.

Qmm

gpjal Insurers Banker's Life and Mutual of Omaha are
examples of commercial insurers that provide nongroup policies. AARP is
an example of a member organization that offers group health insurance
policies. Because commercial insurers are able to age-rate, a practice of
charging higher premiums to older enrollees, and to reject coverage on the
basis of health status, they serve a smaller, and probably healthier,
segment of Medicare beneficiaries than does BC/BS. According to a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report (see Congressional Quarterly
February 17, 1990), on average premium rates for commercial insurers are
rising more slowly than those for BC/BS.
.

.

HMO

Health Ma in^nanrp Organizations. There are three types of
coverage for Medicare beneficiaries: Risk Contracts, Wrap-Around
Contracts, and Cost Contracts. All
plans have some restrictions on
which health care providers a beneficiary may choose.

HMO

An

HMO

Medicare Risk Contract is a substitute for rather than a
Under a Risk Contract, an
agrees to a
certain level of federal reimbursement for providing elders with health care
services. (The reimbursement level is computed using a formula that
begins with 95% of the estimated Part A and Part B costs for a senior on a
fee-for-service plan and adjusts this figure based on demographic factors.)
A beneficiary receives all the benefits of Medicare Parts A and B without
deductibles and co-payments. There are usually additional preventive care
delivery
benefits. All medical services must be received within the
system in order to be reimbursed. Neither Medicare benefits nor
supplemental benefits extend beyond the delivery system. In 1991, 6 out of
23 licensed HMOs in Massachusetts had Medicare Risk Contracts.
supplement

HMO

to Medicare.

HMO

HMOs may also choose
Contracts, plans that

Wrap-Around Contracts or Cost
function more like traditional Medigap products.
to offer

While these types of contracts look almost identical to a Risk Contract for
the Medicare beneficiary receiving care from within the delivery system,
they are supplements to, not substitutes for, Medicare. HMOs, which may
have switched to these models because they found the Medicare

6

reimbursement inadequate, are federally reimbursed on a fee-for-service
basis. Central Massachusetts Health Care and Tufts Associated Health
Plan are two examples of HMOs that have dropped their Risk Contracts
and replaced them with Wrap-Around Contracts.

Under Wrap-Around Contracts, enrollees receive all supplemental
Medicare benefits when utilizing services within the delivery system. This
means that enrollees do not pay Medicare deductibles or co-payments. In
contrast to the Risk Contracts, however, the Wrap-Around Contracts allow
enrollees to maintain Medicare Part A and Part B benefits outside the
delivery system provided they pay all deductibles and co-payments.
Cost Contracts are a combination of the Risk Contracts and WrapAround Contracts. Under Cost Contracts, there are again full
delivery system. Outside the
supplemental benefits within the
system, however, enrollees maintain only Medicare Part A benefits and

HMO

must themselves pay the hospital deductible and coinsurance. Medicare
Part

B

services are only reimbursable within the delivery system.

How

is

Medigap insurance regulated?

Until 1978, Medigap policies were regulated as other insurance
products were -- by state government. As the Medigap insurance industry
grew, however, abuses in the market quickly developed. By the mid-1970s,

abuses such as the following began to surface:

o

the sale of multiple, overlapping

same
o

Medigap

policies to the

individual;

the sale of policies that duplicated the Medicare or Medicaid

coverage the individual was already receiving; and

o

the sale of worthless policies through clever marketing
devices, including scare tactics

and the use of misleading

names, single "dread disease" plans.

These practices were serious enough

to

command

federal attention.

FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Baucos Amendment The most notable early effort to reduce abuses
related to the sale of Medigap policies was the 1980 Baucus Amendment,

named for its chief sponsor Senator Max Baucus. Included in the
Amendment was the prohibition of the sale of duplicate policies to

the

same individual and the setting of "federal standards." These standards
defined basic coverage and required that 60% of the monies collected as
premiums for nongroup policies and 75% for group policies be returned
the enrollees in the form of benefits.

to

These percentages are known as loss

ratios.

The Amendment was, however, a voluntary program. Insurers who
agreed to the guidelines were declared "federally approved," but other
insurers were not prohibited from offering policies. The Baucus

Amendment proved

to be but

one

in a series of federal reforms

aimed

at

eliminating the abuses in the Medigap market.

QjjUjjjgiia

Budget Reconciliation Act The most recent federal

initiative regulating the sale of

Omnibus Budget

OBRA

Medigap

policies is contained in the

Reconciliation Act of 1990

(OBRA

'90).

Included in

'90 are provisions that:

o

require that every policy offer a core group of "basic benefits"
which address certain costs of Medicare Part A and Part B;

o

standardize the language of policies in order to make
comparisons among the many policies easier;

o

require that each policy inform the Medicare recipient that

only one Medigap policy

Medigap
o

is

needed

or, if

on Medicaid, no

policy is needed;

increase the protection against the sale of duplicate coverage
to the

same

individual;

o

mandate enrollment eligibility
months after they turn 65;

o

guarantee renewability;

o

mandate the approval of each Medigap

for all seniors for the first six

policy by the state

insurance commission or comparable body; and

8

o

premium

65%

(rather than the previous 60%) of the
collected for nongroup policies be returned to the

require that

enrollees in benefits (effective

These federal regulations apply

to all

November

1991).

nongroup Medigap

policies in all

states.

STATE REGULATIONS
In comparison with other states, Massachusetts has

many more

Medigap policies. As noted above, there are only
benefit packages. This means that all nongroup
nongroup
approved
four
Medigap policies offered in the Commonwealth must fit the coverage
requirements of one of the four packages. Premium rates for all these
policies are subject to disapproval by the Massachusetts Division of
Insurance. Additionally, no Medigap policy approved for sale may exclude
coverage for any particular health condition. The practice of refusing
regulations relating to

coverage for health services related to a particular illness or health

problem

is

known as a

pre-existing condition exclusion.

Blue Cross and Bine Shield Rpgnlatipna. BC/BS was chartered
under Massachusetts law as a "nonprofit hospital service corporation" and
a "medical service corporation." (See Chapters 176A and 176B of the
Massachusetts General Laws.) BC/BS has the unique social responsibility
of providing access to health care for

all

residents of the

Commonwealth,

regardless of health status.

As products of the "insurer of last resort," the Medigap packages of
sold under the brand name of Medex, are subject to more
regulation than any other policies. BC/BS must:

BC/BS,

o

accept

o

hold an open enrollment period from February

o

all

applicants;

NOT age-rate,

1 -

March

31;

a practice of charging higher premiums for

older seniors;

premium rates by pooling everyone
known as community rating;

o

set

o

keep premium rates in

effect for

in the state, a process

an entire year,

subject nongroup

premiums

subject nongroup

premiums

to approval by the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance;

to a public hearing;

and

demonstrate cost containment measures each year which
result in savings for Medex customers. An example is the
recently approved mail-order drug option. The requirement
that BC/BS demonstrate annual cost containment measures
is known as Chapter 199 and has been in effect since 1984.
(See p. 28.)

r^mmprc ial

Insurer Regulations, Commercial insurers are subject
only to the above mentioned federal and state regulations which apply to

Medigap policies. They are free to reject applicants because of health
and can charge higher premiums to older enrollees. Unlike BC/BS,
they can raise their premiums at any point throughout the year.
all

status

Health

Ma inten^nrp

Organization Regulations. There are specific

consumer protections for enrollees in HMOs. All HMOs offering the
federal Medicare substitute plans known as Risk Contracts must have
internal Quality Assurance Programs.

Peer Review Organizations evaluate

the access and quality of care provided by

HMOs.

While HMOs are not required to offer supplemental coverage to
Medicare beneficiaries, if they choose to do so, they must have a twomonth open enrollment period for individuals and must coordinate their
group enrollment with other group health plans. There are no state
regulations governing age-rating and pre-existing condition exclusions for

HMO plans, but

HMOs

cannot base their
premiums on age and are limited in the exclusions they can make based
on health status. Unlike BC/BS, HMOs can raise their premiums at any
point throughout the year for their supplemental-type contracts.
these

10

"federally approved"

COST TRENDS
we

will investigate the increases in the premium
Medigap products offered by BC/BS: Standard,
Medex 2, Medex 3, and Basic. We will examine the impact of the
changing health insurance industry and the decreasing

In this chapter

rates for the four

competitiveness of

premiums

In 1991, almost

73%

were enrolled in Medex
below, side-by-side, are

Security Cost-of-Living

SSCOLAs
The

BC/BS on

300%

the

increase in

Medex 3

over the past ten years.
of seniors enrolled in

BC/BS Medex

plans

Medex product. Listed
the monthly premiums for Medex 3, and the Social
Adjustments (SSCOLAs) for the same time period.
3,

the most comprehensive

are used to determine elders' monthly Social Security checks.

income was 52%
premiums was 298%.

total percentage increase of seniors' Social Security

while the corresponding aggregate rise in
Social Security

Year

SSCOLA

Medex

%

%

Increase

v.

Medex 3

3

Increase

Medex

3

Monthly Premiums

1980

14.3%

15.8%

$21.58

1981

11.2%

7.6%

$23.21

1982

7.4%

20.6%

$27.99

22.9%

$34.39

delayed

1983

til

1/84

1984

3.5%

16.4%

$40.04

1985

3.5%

8.2%

$43.34

l<>86

3.1%

0.0%

$43.34

1987

1.3%

10.5%

$47.89

1988

4.2%

9.3%

$52.32

1989

4.0%

0.0%

$52.32

1990

4.7%

64.1%

$85.87

TOTAL

52

%

298%

1991

5.4%

These are non group premium rates. Group
Insurance and may therefore be significantly
Source:

Massachusetts

7.0%
rates are not subject

$91.97
to the approval

of the Division of

higher.

Division of Insurance
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on Medex 3 were paying $258.96 per year for their
Medicare supplemental insurance. In 1990, they were paying $1030.44 per
year. If the premium rates had risen at the same rate as the SSCOLAs,
which determine seniors' Social Security income, seniors enrolled in Medex
3 would only be paying $392.58 per year.
In 1980, seniors

Although increases in Medex 2 and Standard policies affect fewer
seniors, they have also been substantial. According to figures at the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance, the ten-year period which brought
seniors a 52% increase in their Social Security checks also brought them a
210% increase in Medex 2 and a 409% increase in Standard. Basic, a new
product first sold by BC/BS in 1990 rose 3.6% in 1991.

Monthly Premium Rates
1980 to 1990

Medex

Year

Standard

1980

$14.02

1981

$15.36

9.6%

$19.86

7.9%

1982

$18.14

18.1%

$24.59

23.8%

1983

$22.92

26.4%

$28.87

17.4%

1984

$26.89

17.3%

$32.26

11.7%

1985

$29.07

8.1%

$32.73

1.5%

1986

$29.07

0.0%

$32.73

0.0%

1987

$32.12

10.5%

$36.17

10.5%

1988

$38.83

20.9%

$31.73

-12.3%

1989

$38.83

0.0%

$31.73

0.0%

1990

$71.29

83.6%

$57.12

80.0%

TOTAL
1991

Source:

Massachusetts

%Incr.

%Incr.

Basic

%Incr.

$18.40

409
$75.05

2

%

5.3%

210
$57.58

$64.69

%

.8%

$67.00

3.6%

Division of Insurance

The following bar graph compares the rate increases of the three Medex
products - Standard, Medex 2, and Medex 3 - and the SSCOLA over the
period 1980 to 1990.
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Medex Premium and SSCOLA Increases
19 8 0-1990
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Massachusetts Division
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FEDERAL FACTORS
Health Care Costs. Rising medical costs are playing a role in the
increasing unaffbrdablity of Medigap insurance. The Massachusetts
medical care inflation rates have been running at 9% since 1985, with a
total increase of 147% from 1980 to 1990. Below are the national inflation
rates alongside the

Medex

3

premium

increases.

Health Care Costs

National

National

National

Year

Inflation

Medical

Hospital

19S1

10.4%

10.8%

14.2%

7.6%

1982

6.1%

11.6%

14.2%

20.6%

1983

3.2%

8.7%

11.4%

22.9%

1984

4.3%

6.2%

8.6%

16.4%

1985

3.6%

6.2%

6.4%

8.2%

1986

1.9%

7.5%

6.0%

0.0%

1987

4.4%

5.8%

6.9%

10.5%

1988

4.1%

6.5%

7.4%

9.3%

1989

4.8%

7.7%

7.1%

0.0%

1990

5.4%

9.0%

10.9%

64.1%

TOTAL
Source:

Dureai

60
oi

Labor

%

115

%

142

%

Medex

298

3

%

Statistics
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Health

Care Costs, 1980-1990

300%

£

50%

-

National

National

National

Mass.

Inflation

Medical
Care

Hospital/
Related

Medical
Care

Mass.

Medex

Services
Source:

Bureau

While hospital and medical
higher

still.

Trends

of

Labor Statistics

inflation rates are high,

drug costs are

According to the Division of Insurance (see Nancy Turnbull,

Medex Use in Massachusetts" in Elders at Risk. 1989), while
the total amount paid out in claims by BC/BS for Medex 3 members
increased 143% from 1980 to 1986, the largest item increase in claims was
for prescription drugs. Prescription drug claims quintupled. From 19801987, the average annual number of prescriptions per enrollee rose from
62 to 13. Accompanying this increased utilization was a jump in the
in

average cost of a prescription from $9.49 to $17.50.

Changs, in the Medicare Program Changes in the Medicare
Program have also affected Medigap insurance in Massachusetts. In 1988
the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) was signed into law.
The MCCA brought changes that expanded some areas of Medicare
coverage and transferred certain costs, including the hospital deductible,
away from Medigap policies.
.

When

was repealed in 1989, approximately $100 million in
back to BC/BS Medigap plans. In addition to
the costs of the benefits taken back by Medigap, there were also
administrative costs associated with policy modification and notification.
this act

Medicare costs were

A GAO
14

shifted

survey (see Congressional Quarterly February
.

17, 1990)

estimated

3

that half of the average

Medigap premium increases in the nation in 1990
the repeal of the MCCA. Changes on the national

were directly related to
level only account for a portion of the crisis in Massachusetts, however.
While the same GAO survey reported that the anticipated rate increases
were to range from 5% to 52%, the Medex rate increase in this state was
67%.

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
gaafflg for Varyin g Percentage Increases in Medea Over the
period from 1980 to 1990, Medex 2 premiums increased 210% as compared
with 298% for Medex 3 and 409% for Standard. The year-by-year
.

premium rates (see p. 12) reveals that in 1988 the
premium rate for Medex 2 actually decreased. The major reason for the
substantial difference in increases among the various plans lies in the fact
that, unlike the Medex 3 and Standard policies, Medex 2 does not offer
any coverage for prescription drugs. The dramatic increases in cost as
reporting of the

well as utilization of prescription drugs have been passed

higher premiums for

Medex 3 and Standard

on

in the

form of

enrollees.

As the premiums have increased, people who do not use

who simply cannot afford the
Standard or Medex 3 coverage to

prescription drugs (as well as seniors

premiums) have downgraded

Medex

their

This trend leaves only high users of drugs in the plans covering

2.

number of claims filed in
number of enrollees. Increased utilization then causes
premium rates.

drugs, thereby increasing the

relation to the

increases in

Increases in Standard over the same period exceeded those of

Medex

3,

a more comprehensive plan. While both products cover

prescription drugs and have the same $35 quarterly deductible, Standard
does not cover the hospital deductible or the Part B deductible. The
difference in the

premium

increases of these two plans

the percentage of the total

premium

is

largely a result of

rate dedicated to prescription drugs.

Prescription drug costs for Standard represent a larger portion of the total

premium than

for

Medex

3.

According to the 1991 rate

filing

breakdown

of the Massachusetts Division of Insurance, prescription drugs accounted

monthly premiums for both Standard and Medex 3. This
premium as opposed to only 38% of the
Medex 3 premium.

for $34.65 of the

represents

46%

of the Standard
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Premium Breakdowns

for

BC/BS Medigap

Plans

1S91

Hospital

Standard

pays

Medex

Co-

4%

2

Hospital
Deductible

Part 8

25%

Coinsurance

20%
Hospital

Prescription

Co-pays

Drugs 46%

5*/.

Part B

Deductible
Part B
Coinsurance

29%

Other

6%

26%
Hospital Co-

Medex

Hospital
Deductible

3

pays

Basl

5%

15%

Part B

Colnsurancii

Prescription
Drugs 38%

Hospital

pays

Co-

B

Part

Deductible

Part

23%

Prescription
Drugs 40%

3%

4%

B

Coinsurance

16%
Other

Source:

Massachusetts

Percentages

may

Other

24%

Division of Insurance

not add up to

100% because of

rounding.

BeasaaiBj Comjg&jyengaa of BC/BS

BC/BS -

54% of the insured
BC/BS HMOs) - and

covering

(64% including

.

In the past, the size of

population in Massachusetts in 1988
the benefits it enjoyed in exchange

BC/BS to sustain
for its status as the "insurer of last resort" allowed
stability of the
losses in its Medigap products without risking the
"advantages"
company. Statutory hospital discounts as weU as other
billing, and the
including partial tax-exempt status, the ban on balance

allowed
on reimbursement to nonparticipating physicians,
its
generate reserves from which it could then subsidize

restrictions

BC/BS

to

expensive lines of coverage internally.

16

33%

However, changes in the health insurance industry and increased
costs and utilization of medical care have undermined the competitive
position of BC/BS and have made internal generation of reserves and the
following subsidization of

The key change

Medigap

in the

the increasing ability of

policies increasingly difficult.

insurance market in recent years has been

HMOs

and commercial insurers

to negotiate

discounts on hospital charges with providers. Often these negotiated
discounts are greater than the statutory discounts for BC/BS which were

designed to allow

As
lines of

BC/BS

to

compete with other insurers.

HMOs

BC/BS

and commercial insurers take away the more profitable
through competitive premiums and benefits, BC/BS loses

source of internal subsidization for the regulated, high-risk lines,
including Medex, which by law it must insure. Over a four-year period
ending in 1990, BC/BS reported a loss of 800,000 subscribers.
its

Administrative Costs At the same time that BC/BS was losing the
competitive advantage of its hospital discounts and, as a result, business
among younger groups, the administrative costs of BC/BS were increasing
significantly faster than income from its premiums. According to five-year
historical data on BC/BS which was part of its 1990 filing, from 1985 to
1989, both the income earned from premiums and the claims incurred
increased 34%. The administrative expenses over the same period of time
increased by 52%. Administrative costs include marketing and claims
.

processing.
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ENROLLMENT TRENDS
Along with the substantial premium increases over the past ten
BC/BS has experienced both an overall decline in enrollment

years,
in its

Medigap

four plans.

policies

In this

and

also a shift in the distribution over

chapter we look

Medigap market along with

the suggested partial solution to the

managed
The

at the

movement within the

on seniors.

its effect

its

Medigap

We

crisis:

also explore

HMO

care.

table below shows the 1980 to 1990 approximate enrollment

and for HMO
policies. The
what portion of
Massachusetts residents over the age of 65 were covered by each Medigap
option. Elders covered by Medicaid or by commercial insurers are not
figures for both

Medex nongroup and group

policies

percentage figures indicate approximately

included in the table.

Medigap Enrollment
1980 to 1990

***

**

*

#Mass

#in

%in

Year

Elders

HMOs

1980

726,531

1984

***

HMOs

#Group
Medex

%Group
Medex

#NonGroup

%NonGroup

4,000

.6%

127,000

17.5%

313,000

43.1%

773,000

20,000

2.6%

119,000

15.4%

325,000

42.0%

1986

791,000

53,162

6.7%

125,000

15.8%

292,000

36.9%

1987

800,000

55,728

7.0%

124,000

15.5%

294,000

36.8%

1988

806,000

54,068

6.7%

102,000

12.7%

288,000

35.7%

1989

815,000

65,200

8.0%

102,670

12.6%

293,801

36.0%

1990

819,284

60^22

7.3%

99,828

12.2%

275,392

33.6%

1980,

1990 United States Census

1984-1988

United States Department

Massachusetts

BC/BS
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Association

of Massachusetts

of

HMOs

of Commerce,

Population

Estimates

and Projections

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
Enrollment Shifting. Enrollment figures alone, however, do not tell
whole
story. While HMOs are insuring a slowly growing segment of
the
the Medicare- eligible population, their participation in the Medigap
market does not necessarily reduce the strain on BC/BS which must
insure the high-risk elderly population. Because HMOs are able to insure
selected segments of the population, their participation in the

Medigap

working against BC/BS. A 1990 General Accounting Office
1990 T-HRD-90-27) published the findings of national studies
which indicated that seniors enrolled in HMOs tend to be healthier and
their care less expensive than average.

market

report

is

(GAO

The Cresap-Tillinghast analysis reported

that from 1982 to 1988,

BC/BS lost 11.4% of the Medicare eligible population aged 65 to 69. This
represents a loss of the youngest, and probably healthiest, segment of the
population. In contrast, over the same time period, BC/BS gained 5.8% of
the market for seniors over age 85.

Shift in

BC/BS Share

Medicare-Eligible

of

Population

1982-1988
6.00%
4.00%
CD

2.00%

a>

c

CO

0.00%

o

-2.00%

c
9)
U
i_

-4.00%

0.

-6.00%

Age
6569

-8.00%

Age
70-

Age

7579

74

Age
85*

Age
8084

•10.00%

12.00%

Age Bands

Source:

Nationally, the

number of "oldest

Cresap-Tillinghast Analysis,

old

is

1990

growing six times faster than any

other segment of the population.
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Additionally, the shift of seniors away from BC/BS is
than the shift of the younger populations which make up the

much

slower

more
BC/BS. As changes in the insurance industry
decrease the competitiveness of BC/BS and allow HMOs to draw more of
the market through relatively attractive premiums and benefits, seniors
represent a growing percentage of the total business of BC/BS. The
profitable insurance lines of

Cresap report showed that in 1988 BC/BS had 42% of the
Commonwealth's insured group market in contrast to approximately 65%
of the insured Medicare-eligible population.

Movement

within

Bf /BS. The

1990 increases in Medex premium
rates caused an alarming number of seniors to drop or downgrade their
BC/BS coverage to less comprehensive and lower-cost plans.

Voluntary terminations in non group Medex plans rose from 1,635 in
1989 to 4,687 in 1990. This represents a 186.7% increase in the number of
individuals dropping their Medex coverage. Nonpayment terminations,
terminations which were not requested but occurred because of
nonpayment of premiums, more than doubled, rising from 3,424 in 1989 to
8,220 in 1991.

Many

other seniors are assuming more risk, downgrading their

coverage while they are relatively healthy or simply because they have been
priced out of the market.

Out of 27,350

their coverage in 1990, only 1,000

Shifts in

elders

upgraded

who

individually changed

it.

Medex Enrollment
1990

20,000
2,600
2,400
1,000

300
1,050

Source:
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DOWNGRADED
DOWNGRADED
DOWNGRADED
DOWNGRADED
DOWNGRADED
UPGRADED

Blue Cross and Blue Shield

-

-

•

from
from
from
from
from

Medex 3
Medex 3
Medex 3

to

Medex 2

to Basic

Standard
Standard to Medex 2
Standard to Basic

from Medex 2

to

to Basic

Dangers of Assuming Greater Risk Downgrading and dropping
coverage creates problems both for individual seniors and for the Medigap
insurance system as a whole. Some seniors assume greater risk in order to
pay less in premiums while they remain relatively healthy, thereby
endangering their health and their financial security. Others simply
cannot afford the health coverage they truly need.
.

If

individuals

from Medex

among

the 21,000

3 or Standard to

Medex

who downgraded

their coverage

2 suddenly need drugs, they will

either face the financial burden of paying for prescription drugs

themselves or they will face more serious illness by going without. If
seniors among the 5,000 who downgraded from Medex 3 to Standard or to
Basic end up in the hospital, they will immediately find themselves with a

$628 first-day hospital deductible.
Additionally, downgrading to a lower-coverage policy

may
who remain

have negative effects on the

coverage entirely

more comprehensive

and dropping

premiums of those

Health insurance is
designed to spread the cost of health care over as broad of a population as
possible by including healthy people who will not use some benefits.
individuals

in

plans.

As more healthy seniors downgrade out of the most comprehensive
Medex 3, the concept of health insurance as risk sharing is destroyed. The
pool of individuals paying for comprehensive benefits becomes both
smaller and less healthy. In 1988, 84% of seniors insured by BC/BS were
covered by

plan

Medex

3.

In 1990, approximately

73% were

enrolled in that

(Massachusetts Division of Insurance). Increased claims because of

a sicker risk pool combined with fewer people contributing premiums force

some premium components of comprehensive coverage

to cost

more.

There is evidence that may suggest that this process, known as
adverse selection, is happening. The distribution of the Medex composite
rate increase across the four plans was significantly different in 1991 than
in 1990. In 1991 the proposed increase in Medex 3 of 11.1% was greater
than the average of the four plans while in 1990 it was lower than the
average 1° 1990 *h* cost of Medex 3 increased by 64% while Medex 2 and
Standard increased by 80% and 84% respectively.

Downgrading and dropping coverage has negative effects on seniors,
on BC/BS, and also on the larger health care system. When access to
health care becomes more difficult, both practically and financially in
terms of increased out-of-pocket costs, it becomes more likely that when an
individual finally receives care
less

it

will

be expensive. Preventive medicine

is

expensive than emergency room costs.
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Poverty Issues

.

There

no conclusive data available on the income
However, while it is clear that some seniors

is

ranges of Medigap enrollees.
are dropping or downgrading Medigap coverage because they can no
longer afford the premiums, seniors who struggle to maintain coverage are
not necessarily able to manage their payments without substantial
financial sacrifice.

According to a Lewis/ICF analysis of population data from 19851988, 16% of Massachusetts senior households live at or below the poverty
line. Another 21% live between poverty and 150% of poverty. Thirty-three
percent

live

between 150% and 300% of poverty.

Poverty Levels of Massachusetts Elders

400%+
Poverty

300-399%
Poverty

Below Poverty

of

16%

18%

of

11%

100-149%
Poverty

200-299%
Poverty
Source:

of

21%

of

50-199%

20%

Poverty

Lewis/ICF Analysis

These percentages are based on

of

13%

single senior households

which include

all

non-institutionalized individuals 65 or older and households of couples in

which one or both individuals are 65 or

Because couples tend to be
better off financially than individual seniors and yet only count once in the
computation of the percentage, the figures above indicate a larger
proportion of elderly at the poverty level than is actually true. However,
on the other hand, since poverty guidelines are lower for couples than for
two individual seniors, couples may be classified misleadingly in higher
income level categories. Couples pay the same in health care premiums as
two individual seniors.
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older.

1991 Federal Poverty Guidelines

100%
150%

200%
300%
400%

A

Individual

Couple

$ 6,620

$ 8,880

$ 9,930

$13320

$13,240

$17,760

$19,860

$26,640

$26,480

$35,520

1988 Living Budgets for Low-Income Seniors in
Massachusetts . Health Care For All) revealed that after paying monthly
expenses excluding medical care, seniors up to 200% of poverty had no or
insufficient income to pay their Medicare Part B and Medex 3 premiums.
1988 analysis

(

In 1991, seniors paid $358.80 annually for Medicare Part

B

Medex 3, they spent $1,103.64 per year on
These two costs together represent 15% of the income for

coverage.

If enrolled in

premiums

alone.

a senior living at 150% of the poverty level and 11% for a senior living at
of the poverty level. The situation is even more serious for couples.

200%

Couples living at 150% of poverty spend about 22% of their income on
Medicare and comprehensive Medigap premiums and couples at 200% of
poverty spend an average of 17%. These percentages do not include the
$35 Medex 3 quarterly drug deductible or coverage for extended hospital
or nursing home care, extended home health care, routine physicals, vision,
foot care,

and dental

care.

The passing of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Act

(parts of which

were repealed in 1989, see p. 14) brought a buy-in benefit for all lowincome Medicare beneficiaries. This program, known as the Qualified
Medicare Beneficiary Program (QMB) authorizes the Department of
Public Welfare (DPW) to pay the Medicare premiums, co-payments, and
deductibles of beneficiaries who meet income and asset guidelines. In
1991, a senior could have assets no greater than $4,000 for an individual
and $6,000 for a couple and could have income no greater than 100% of
the poverty level.

Under the
Medicare Part B

QMB

Program, the $29.90 monthly premium for

noi automatically deducted from a senior's monthly
Social Security check.
automatically covers the premium, and
is

DPW

seniors do not need

Medigap insurance

to cover their

Medicare

deductibles and co-payments.
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Since the passage of the

QMB

income

Program, there has been an

program and bring some

enroll qualified elderly into this

effort to

relief to low-

Efforts, however, have not been successful.

elders.

According to a
Foundation report (see The Secret Benefit: The Failure to
Provide Medicare Buv-in to Poor Seniors 1991), out of the 77,000 seniors
(plus a lesser number of disabled under age 65) eligible for the QMB
program in Massachusetts, 45,000 (58%) are not enrolled. Most of these
people do not receive Medicaid, and many are almost certainly purchasing
Families

USA

.

Medigap coverage.
According to a report released by the Harvard School of Public
Health, Louis Harris and Associates, and the Department of Medical
Security (see A Household Survey of the Health Insurance Status of
Massachusetts Residents . 1990), an underinsured individual is one whose
out-of-pocket health care costs exceed

we use

10% of personal income.

standard conservatively and agree that 10% of annual
income is a reasonable amount to dedicate to health care premium costs
(as opposed to all health care costs), seniors at the poverty level need an
annual subsidy of over $2,000 while those at 300% of poverty need
approximately $250. An adequate subsidy based on assistance to all
seniors at or below 300% of the poverty rate (and assuming increased
enrollment in Medicaid and the
Program) would run in the
neighborhood of $151 million for the state of Massachusetts.
If

this

QMB

MANAGED CARE AND THE ROLE OF HMOs
With health care
with the repeal of the

costs rising

MCCA,

and Medicare coverage being cut back

the federal government has encouraged the

coverage of Medicare beneficiaries through managed care options rather
than through fee-for-service plans, such as those traditionally offered by
BC/BS. As both insurers and providers, HMOs seemed to meet the
perceived need of cost-effective care and to offer a reasonable solution to
the growing unaffordability of

when

HMOs

BC/BS Medigap

products.

opened their doors to seniors on a large
scale, there was an initial wave of enrollments of Medicare beneficiaries in
these managed care programs. In recent years, however, growth has
slowed significantly. (See p. 18.) While managed care plans offer positive
In 1985,

first

incentives for providing efficient care, rising health care costs are driving

up
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HMO premiums as well.

HMO

Monthly Premiums

%

Bay State

Harvard

%

Year

Community

1987

$45.00

1988

$55.00

22.2%

$60.20

89.6%

$35.00

75.0%

1989

$67.50

22.7%

$55.00

-9.5%

$53.50

52.9%

1990

$70.00

3.7%

$55.00

0.0%

$59.72

11.6%

55

1987-1988
1989-1990

Office of Prepaid

Executive

Incr

%

%

Fallon

$31.75

TOTAL
Source:

Incr

Incr

$20.00

73

%

199

%

Health Care

Office of Elder Affairs

The increases in the premiums for these HMOs have a fairly wide
range. Although some have been more moderate than those for Medex, all
have been greater than both the SSCOLAs and the medical inflation rate
over the same time period. Unlike BC/BS, if providing health care to the
Medicare population becomes too costly and federal reimbursement for
Risk Contracts inadequate, HMOs can choose not to offer Medigap
products at all or to offer only the more traditional Wrap-Around
Contracts.

(See p.

6.)

According to the Massachusetts Association of HMOs, in 1988, 15
out of the 22 licensed HMOs in Massachusetts (68%) offered Risk
Contracts. In 1991, only 6 out of the 23 licensed HMOs (26%) offered
Risk Contracts. Three offered Wrap-Around Contracts and three offered
Cost Contracts. These newer products are supplements to rather than
substitutes for Medicare and provide less opportunity for cost
containment.
In addition to their demonstrated limitations in the area of cost

containment, HMOs have specific restrictions which make them
inappropriate for some elderly people. As explained above, all
plans
have both provider and geographic constraints. Under an HMO, seniors

HMO

cannot choose their own doctors and may lose the care of a long-time
doctor. Also, the geographic restrictions would make an
plan
inappropriate/inconvenient for seniors who have more than one primary
residence. Much of
care is not reimbursable outside of the
delivery system. Managed care through HMOs alone is clearly not the

HMO

HMO

HMO

solution to the question of affordable

Medigap insurance.
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DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
The

first

three sections of this report describe

Medigap

insurance in Massachusetts and, by exploring cost and
enrollment trends in BC/BS, offer some explanation of the
origins of today's crisis. Below are both theoretical
directions for reform as well as analyses of concrete
legislative proposals.

THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS
In broadest terms,

when working within

the context of the insurance

market in Massachusetts, there are two theoretical approaches to the
problem of the growing lack of affordability of Medigap coverage:
o Reduce Medigap premium costs; or
o Subsidize Medigap premiums.

Reducing Medigap premium costs actually lowers the overall expense of
providing care, while the subsidization approach leaves the price
unaffected but provides funds to help seniors pay their premiums.

into

Each of these two basic approaches can be further broken down
more concrete means for attaining cost reductions or premium

subsidization.

Methods of reducing the cost of Medigap premiums:
Reduce the benefits of Medigap coverage,
o

cutting out

expensive services and/or increasing enrollee co-

o

payments and deductibles;
Reduce the amount insurers pay

o

Medigap services/benefits; or
Reduce the utilization of Medigap

to providers for

services.

Methods of subsidizing Medigap premiums:
o
"Cross subsidize" Medigap with other

lines of

insurance which serve healthier, less expensive
populations;

o

o
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Find other subsidy sources within the health care
system (such as the Massachusetts Uncompensated
Care Pool); or
Use tax revenue to subsidize Medigap products.

These basic approaches as well as the strategies under each approach can
be combined in various ways in an effort to maximize their effectiveness.
The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are explained below.

REDUCTION OF MEDIGAP COSTS
Reducing actual premium costs is desirable but far from simple.
Each strategy for cost reduction has drawbacks or limitations.

Reduce Benefits

.

One approach, proposed

by

BC/BS

in

testimony before the Joint Committee on Health Care, is to reduce
benefits. By covering fewer benefits, the price of insurance will go down.
Benefits can be reduced either by leaving selected services uncovered or by

BC/BS

contends that Medex 3 is
the "richest benefit package in the country" and that even with cuts in the
benefits it would still provide reasonably comprehensive coverage. A
increasing co-payments and deductibles.

change

in the benefit

packages would require a

shift in the state

regulations.

The major problem with the

approach is that it
not real cost containment. Rather, it is cost shifting. Reducing benefits
does not control the amount of money spent on health care. It transfers
costs from the insurer to the individual through increased out-of-pocket
costs for uncovered services or through higher co-payments and
deductibles. This approach is therefore a regressive one in which the
benefit reduction

premiums is shifted
who need and use more health

resulting reduction of

to "higher cost elders,"

individuals

services.

is

Reduce the Price Paid for Services Another way to reduce
premiums is to reduce the price that an insurer pays providers for
Medigap services. However, reducing the price paid by insurers is
.

difficult, especially for traditional insurance plans such as those offered
through BC/BS. Much of what Medigap insurance pays for is governed by
the federal Medicare Program and is therefore out of the control of the
Medigap insurer. When Medicare raises the first day hospital deductible,
Medigap insurance premiums rise in order to cover the additional expense.

HMOs

have a greater

ability

than

BC/BS

or other commercial

insurers to reduce the prices they pay providers for

Medigap

services.

Through Risk Contracts (see p. 6), they control not only the "gap"
payments but also the entire flow of Medicare dollars. However, when
Medicare increases costs to beneficiaries, HMOs may not be able to make
up the difference solely by reducing provider payments. Instead or in
addition, they may choose to raise premiums. While some HMO
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premiums do remain lower than Medex premiums, there is no conclusive
evidence that explains how much of this difference results from lower
payments to providers, how much from reduced utilization, and how much
from insuring younger, healthier enrollees.
Although traditional insurers have limited control over the amount
paid for health care services, one area where they can have some impact is

payment

for prescription drugs.

40%

Prescription drugs, accounting for
of the increases in recent years, represent one of the fastest growing
in

portions of

Medex premium

rates.

(See p. 16.)

In accordance with their requirement to demonstrate efforts at cost

containment,

BC/BS

started a mail-order prescription service option for

maintenance medications which will reduce costs by enabling BC/BS to
obtain cheaper prices based on volume. Seniors will pay a fixed co-

payment of $2 for generic drugs and $10 for brand name drugs. BC/BS
has estimated that a mail-order drug option will cut drug costs by an
average of 10%. While the adoption of a mail-order prescription service

down the current premium rates
the program will slow the rate of increase.

will certainly not drive

hope

is

that

Reduce Utiintfujm. The third approach

for

to reducing

Medex, the

premiums

is to

reduce utilization of services. This approach, too, has its limitations as a
The best way to reduce utilization is obviously
to prevent people from getting sick. Unfortunately, the medical profession
is oriented toward cure rather than prevention. The Medicare Program
and most Medigap plans offer little coverage for preventive care. Also,
elderly people have a lifetime of accumulated health risks. A serious
prevention effort aimed at keeping older people healthy needs to start at
cost containment strategy.

an early age.
Another way to reduce utilization is to influence the behavior of
physicians. An example of reducing drug utilization is a proposal of
BC/BS known as "counter detailing." Counter detailing was proposed by
BC/BS in 1991. This new effort is a response to a practice of drug
companies called "detailing." Detailing takes place when drug companies
send representatives to doctors' offices to encourage the use of new drugs.
New drugs are often more expensive, and not always superior to drugs that
have been on the market for a while. Counter detailing involves sending a
representative to doctors' offices to inform physicians on the most costeffective ways of prescribing drugs.
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Efforts to reduce drug utilization by influencing the behavior of
physicians through counter detailing have potential for success because

Medigap insurance is the primary payer for prescription drugs. However,
since Medigap insurance pays only a small portion of the hospital or
physician bill, it is difficult to use Medigap reimbursement to influence
other ways doctors practice.

would be necessary to

In order to influence these other areas,

make changes

in the health

it

care system as a whole,

or at least in Medicare, that would discourage unnecessary procedures,
establish standards of care, and reduce "defensive medicine" which arises
with the fear of medical malpractice.

Again, for

HMOs

somewhat different. Since many
they presumably have more control over

the situation

HMOs

is

have physicians on salary,
practice patterns. However, the fact that a number of HMOs have shifted
from Risk Contracts to more traditional Wrap Around Contracts

HMO

premiums suggests

combined with the steady

rise in

either price or utilization

may remain an unattained

that controlling

goal.

SUBSIDIZATION OF MEDIGAP PREMIUMS
Since subsidization does not inherently address cost containment,
subsidization

is

if

chosen, either the size of the subsidy must be increased

annually or the real value of the subsidy will diminish.

It is difficult

come up with a subsidy source which can keep pace with

to

the rising costs of

health care.

Like cost containment, there are several different approaches to
subsidizing

Medigap premiums.

Cross Safryi^"? «"fli Other

bi^nram-g

One way to subsidize
Medigap is to require insurers to sell Medigap at below the cost of claims
and administration. Insurers would then make up the difference by
raising their prices in other insurance products. This was, in fact what
happened with Medex during much of the 1980s. BC/BS regularly lost
money on Medex and offset those losses by reserves it had generated from
other lines of business. BC/BS was able to do this because it controlled
such a large percentage of the health insurance market and had a special
discount on hospital services that allowed for the creation of a surplus
from their group plans. Although not an explicit subsidy mechanism, this
process helped it to offset losses in its Medigap and nongroup insurance
I in**?-

lines.
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In a competitive insurance environment, however, this approach
does not work. Insurance companies compete by trying to offer the lowest

possible price to an employer group.

If

insurers have to

make up

for

charging more in another, they are likely to lose
business. BC/BS provides a good example of how cross subsidization does
not work in a competitive environment.
losses in

one

line by

Over time, BC/BS has been losing the advantages that enabled
cross subsidize Medex. Although BC/BS still has a hospital discount,
HMOs are going out and negotiating their own discounts which are
sometimes larger than that of BC/BS. The "Blues" are losing their

it

to

competitive advantage. Also, the Blues are competing for business with
HMOs, which do not have to accept everyone and which do not have to

have contracts with every doctor and hospital. As a
steadily being under-priced by competitors

and

is

result,

BC/BS

is

losing business.

With health care costs rising and with fewer people subscribing
BC/BS, the cost per BC/BS subscriber of subsidizing Medex has been
growing.

to

In response to the increasing burden of cross subsidization in

BC/BS was granted a huge
The increase transferred $100 million in

combination with a number of external factors,

Medigap

rate increase in 1990.

costs onto the elderly.

In the three years preceding the rate increase,

BC/BS

averaged approximately $48 million per year in Medex subsidies.
In 1990, BC/BS reported an internal Medex subsidy of $18 million. The
1990 rate increase did not, however, solve the long-term problems facing

BC/BS.
The Medex

BC/BS

Relief Bill (see p. 33)

to subsidize

was

filed to restore the ability of

Medigap insurance.

Use Other Subsidy Source Another potential subsidy source is the
state's "Uncompensated Care Pool" (also known as the "Hospital Free Care
Pool"). The Uncompensated Care Pool is money created by adding a
.

surcharge onto every private sector hospital bill in the state. In 1991 the
surcharge was about 11%. There is no surcharge on Medicare or Medicaid
bills.

This surcharge is then used to pay hospitals for giving care to the
uninsured or underinsured. Low-income elders who do not have Medigap
insurance sometimes use the pool to pay for their first-day hospital
deductible.
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Since elders are already using the pool, some have suggested that
instead of paying hospital bills, money from the pool could be targeted to
subsidize insurance. (See Revised Medigap Relief Bill and Senate Bill 406,

Pool money could be used to fund vouchers for the elderly or could
be paid directly to insurers to offset losses in Medigap insurance. This
approach would increase the need for free care pool funds, and therefore
p. 34.)

increase the hospital surcharge needed to fund the pool.

Using the pool has two drawbacks. First, with a cap on the size of
the pool, most analysts agree that it is already under funded, by perhaps
$100 million or more. Diverting some of the pool to subsidize Medigap
could pit underinsured elders against uninsured workers in a fight over
scarce pool dollars.

Secondly, the pool

is

essentially a "sickness tax."

not funded very equitably.

While

all

The pool

is

privately insured people pay into the

pool indirectly via premiums to insurance companies, sicker groups pay

more than healthy groups because they use the hospital more.
Use Tax Revenue. Using either general revenue or a dedicated tax
to subsidize Medigap is the third main alternative. The advantage of tax
revenue is that it is likely to be more equitable than pool funding. The
problem with using general revenue is that again, like the Uncompensated
Care Pool, it has the potential of pitting the elderly against other needy
groups (and even against other elders), particularly at a time when health
care, housing, and other programs are being cut. A dedicated tax avoids
this pitfall. This was the approach used in the 1989 Medigap Assistance
Bill. This bill was not adopted. The main road block to this approach is
political. Neither the Governor nor the Legislature is considering new tax
measures

in 1991.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Federal Proposals

The Pepper Commission, a United

States bipartisan commission on

comprehensive health care, released its final report in the fall of 1990.
Included in its proposals for health care reform were specific sections on
reforms for the over 65 population. The Commission recommended the
following:
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o
o
o

Federal assistance with Medicare premiums and
deductibles for all seniors below 200% of poverty;
Expansion of Medicare services to include selected
preventive services; and

Medigap insurance reforms, including counseling
local levels, extension of "federal standards," and
increased consumer protections.

The Pepper Commission estimated

at

that the proposed reforms

would
improve health care for 30 million Americans at a total cost to the federal
government of $2.8 billion. The report did not include a financing
mechanism to meet the additional costs.

Some

of the recommendations of the Pepper

Commission have been
adopted. A part of the Medicare Catastrophic Act that was not repealed
includes the expansion of Medicare services to cover mammograms and
the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary Program (see p. 23) which pays for
Medicare premiums and deductibles for seniors at the poverty line. OBRA
'90 (see p. 8) approved increased federal standards and consumer
protections.

Federal assistance for

all

seniors below

200%

of poverty

remains unaddressed.

State Initiatives
In addition to the federal proposals embraced by the Pepper

Commission and included

in other reforms, several bills designed to

address the affordability of Medigap insurance have been filed in
Massachusetts in 1991. Each of the proposals uses a different strategy to
deal with the health insurance needs of senior citizens.

Th^

Fflpily Hejlf h Plan.

As a solution to the health care crisis
which is plaguing the entire state, young and old alike, Representative
John McDonough (D - Jamaica Plain) filed a comprehensive health care
reform bill (House Bill 4145). This bill, known as the Family Health Plan
(FHP), would provide access to basic health care for all residents of
Massachusetts, regardless of health status, employment, or age.

The FHP would provide all seniors with Medigap insurance which
would cover Medicare deductibles, co-payments, and prescription drugs.
FHP had been in effect in 1990, seniors would have paid $35 per month
for coverage equivalent to

month.
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Medex

3.

In 1990,

Medex 3

cost $85.95 per

If

The

FHP

would reduce costs

for seniors by cross-subsidizing instead
of creating separate senior risk pools. The cost of health care for the

elderly

would be averaged

required to pay.

The

into the

FHP

also

premiums

would

all

residents would be

offer the prospect of systemic cost

For example, one statewide purchaser rather than multiple
purchasers would lower costs across the board.

containment.

FHP

would require fundamental structural changes in the
-- most dramatically in the role of the health insurance
system. To implement such a dramatic change, advocates would have to
overcome both the public skepticism associated with expanding the role of
government and the powerful institutional opposition from those who
benefit from the current health care financing system. In addition, the
shift from a premium-based to a tax-based system would, in the short run,

The

health care system

substantially reallocate health care costs, creating

many winners and

losers.

Medex

Relief Bill

provide assistance to

all

The Medex

Medex

Relief Bill (House Bill 4170)

would

subscribers without tax increases or

new

state funding.

BC/BS,

currently the primary insurer for

Medigap subscribers,

would, with the help of discounts on hospital charges, continue to serve the
majority of the seniors insured by Medigap products.

However, in order
remain competitive, commercial insurers and HMOs would
have to offer community rates for all Medigap, small group, and nongroup
products that they offer and would not be allowed to discriminate in the
sale of these policies based on age or health status. These provisions
would force the commercial or
insurers to take their share of the
sicker members of these groups should they choose to offer such products.
The ability of commercial insurers and HMOs to negotiate discounts on
hospital charges would be directly related to their participation in the
market for Medigap, small group, and nongroup products.
for

BC/BS

to

HMO

In return for the restrictions placed on commercial

and

HMO

BC/BS would have to dedicate a fixed percentage of the reserves
was allowed to generate from hospital discounts to Medex premium
costs. The result would be a dollar decrease in premiums paid by all
Medex subscribers. The BC/BS discount could be raised in order to
insurers,
it

adjust for the size of subsidies.

While all Medex subscribers would receive a subsidy of roughly
low-income
subscribers would receive an additional $360, the dollar
$300,
equivalent of the portion of the premium attributed to hospital claim
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Their hospital care would be charged to the free care pool.
Because
low-income seniors are entitled to free care (see p. 30), the portion of their
premium dedicated to hospital costs would be covered by the pool.

costs.

Additionally, under

House

increases would be limited to the

Bill 4170, all future

Medigap rate
Price Index (CPI)-Medical

Consumer

Although the Medical Care rate of inflation,
averaging 9% annually in Massachusetts, is significantly higher than the
SSCOLAs, it is significantly lower than the Medex rate increases in recent

Care rate of

inflation.

Seniors would be protected from retroactive effective dates that
apply regarding such increases.

years.

While the change required for the adoption of the Medex Relief
would be less drastic than that required for the FHP, it does represent
substantial change, and, as a result, would elicit serious political

Bill

opposition.

The current practice of discounting
and hospitals negotiate their own

insurers

is

one

rates.

in

which individual

Under the

bill,

negotiating would be prohibited except to subsidize socially determined

ends (for example, Medigap). The
the state.

level of these discounts

Strict regulation of hospital prices

direction from that which Massachusetts
is

more insurance companies and

for

is

moves

currently pursuing.

HMOs

who do

set

by

The trend

to negotiate hospital

discounts. Also, since neither the free care pool nor the
affect businesses

would be

in the opposite

BC/BS

discount

not provide insurance, some businesses that

would not be contributing

to the cost of

Medigap

for their retirees.

M

^igap Relief BilL The Joint Committee on Insurance
Revised
rewrote the Medex Relief bill, changing the funding mechanism and
eliminating the protection of the CPI-Medical Care rate of inflation. The
new bill (House Bill 5530) calls for the transfer of $75 million annually
a trust to subsidize Medigap insurance
beginning in January 1992. There would be full subsidization for enrollees
at or below the federal poverty level and partial subsidization for

from the

free care pool to

individuals

up

While

to

300%

this is

of poverty.

perhaps the most

politically feasible option in the

short run, it would increase the demand on the free care pool. As noted
previously there are several drawbacks to this approach. Also, because the
bill

lacks any cost containment provisions, the size of the subsidy would

need

to be increased annually or the value of the subsidy

erode.
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would steadily

Another approach to using the free care pool
relies on payments to insurance companies instead of to individual
subscribers. This approach is embodied in Senate Bill 406, sponsored by
Senator Edward Burke (D - Framingham) as part of a larger hospital
Hospital Finance Bill

finance

.

bill.

Senate

Bill

406 would require that

free care pool

funds be used

to

reimburse insurers for 50% of losses they incur in their Medigap line for
fee-for-service (indemnity) insurance and for 75% of losses for managed
care plans. (The intent is to encourage and reward managed care plans.)
If adequate funds are not available from the free care pool, payments to
insurers would be reduced in proportion to each insurer's market share,
not in proportion to the size of their loss.

For example, suppose there are two insurance companies that

sell

Medigap insurance. Company 1 has 75% of the business and Company 2
has 25%. Each insurer loses $20 million dollars on Medigap. If there is

Company 1 will get
market, and Company 2 will

only $10 million available to subsidize Medigap,
million, in proportion to its

75%

of the

$7.5
get

$2.5 million.

In order to be eligible to receive the subsidy, insurers
following criteria.

o
o

They must:
hold an annual open enrollment period;

charge reduced premiums to elders with incomes

below 300% of the poverty

o

must meet the

limit

premium

and
not more than 10%

increases to

line;

annually.

The

cost of determining eligibility for the subsidy rests with the insurer.

This proposal calls for
voucher program.

less state

administration than

is

necessary for a

However, this approach does not provide stability for elders.
Rather than promoting an entitlement for the elder person, it entitles
insurers. Nothing in the bill determines the size of the available subsidy
per elder or how much total money will be available. Insurers can decide
whether they would be better off with a small Medigap rate increase and
write off their losses, or a large increase and no rate subsidy in any given
year.

35

When
pool to

adequate funding is available, payment from the free care
the insurer is connected to the size of losses rather than to the size

of the subsidy being offered to seniors.

Therefore, the incentive

is

for

Medigap insurance while offering the
Despite the amount of the rate subsidy, all

insurers to allocate losses to their
smallest subsidy possible.

insurers receive payments from the free care pool equivalent to 50% of
total losses for fee-for-service plans. The nominal subsidy which is

encouraged by the financial incentives of

make Medigap insurance more
In any case, an insurer

affordable for

is still

may do very little to
those who can least afford

this bill

worse off offering Medigap and

than not offering policies at all. It is not
assuming some
clear that this approach will do more than improve the cash position of
BC/BS, which is obligated to offer Medigap.
financial loss
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it.

CONCLUSION
Coverage for the gaps

Medicare Program was not a concern for
those who drafted the federal law in 1965. When Medicare began, Medicaid
served as Medigap insurance for low-income elders, and the relatively
nominal out-of-pocket Medicare costs (the original hospital deductible was
$40) were not beyond the financial resources of middle-income seniors.
However, as health care costs have continued to outpace the growth of elders'
income, many near-poor elders are unable to afford either out-of-pocket costs
in the

or Medigap premiums.
It is

clear that nothing approaching universal

Medigap coverage can

be achieved without relying on a cross-generational subsidy. However, basic
who will pay the subsidy, how it will be collected, and who will

questions of

remain unanswered. The problem of unchecked medical inflation
especially difficult to resolve. Without control
over health care costs, subsidies will continually have to be increased.
receive

it

makes the Medigap problem

While solutions to this problem have begun to be debated both in
Congress and in the Massachusetts Legislature, progress has been slow. The
most comprehensive solution to the problem may be the adoption of a
universal health care system such as those in Western Europe or the
Commonwealth countries (Great Britain, Canada, Australia). However, such
an approach, whether pursued nationally, or on a state-by-state basis, faces
significant political barriers. Other less sweeping reforms may address the
problem in the short run, providing temporary relief to Massachusetts elders,
but any true long-term solution must both offer a subsidy and also bring
stabilization to the rising cost of health care.
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GLOSSARY
ADVERSE SELECTION
Adverse selection occurs when an insurance policy attracts very sick
who have a greater than average number of claims. These
individuals then become concentrated in particular insurance plans, driving
up the price. Insurance companies use denial of coverage, waiting periods,

enrollees

and pre-existing condition exclusions

to protect themselves

from adverse

selection.

AGE-RATING
Age-rating

when they apply

is

premiums on the age of individuals
Older seniors pay higher premiums.

the practice of basing

for health coverage.

BAN ON BALANCE BILLING
The ban on balance billing is a restriction that prohibits a provider
from charging and collecting more for a medical service than an insurance
plan will cover.
The term is most commonly used in reference to a
Massachusetts law requiring doctors to abide by Medicare rates.

COMMUNITY RATING
Community
averaging
the

rating

is

the practice of setting insurance rates

all enrollees' costs together.

same premium

by

Everyone served by an insurer pays

for a given benefit package, regardless of individual health

status.

CO-PAYMENT
A co-payment

is

the share of the cost of care that the recipient must

For example, under the new mail-order prescription drug options,
on Medex 3 pay a co-payment of $10 for every brand-name
prescription and $2 for every generic prescription.
Medex pays the
pay.

seniors

remainder.

COST CONTRACTS

HMO

delivery system
These plans cover Medicare Part A outside the
(with the exclusion of deductibles and co-payments), but offer coverage for
(See Health
delivery system.
Part B services only within the
Maintenance Organization.)

HMO
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COUNTER DETAILING
Counter detailing
effective use of drugs.

is

an

effort

on the part of

BC/BS

to

encourage cost-

sends representatives to doctors' offices to advocate
the use of the most appropriate and cost-effective drugs.
Newer, more
expensive options are not always superior to drugs that have been on the
It

market longer. (See Detailing.)

DEDUCTIBLE
A

deductible

is

an

initial dollar

amount of health care

cost that an

individual must incur before an insurer begins to pay the cost of the health

For example, the Medicare first-day hospital deductible is $628. If
seniors are without supplemental insurance that covers this cost, they are
responsible for paying the $628 before Medicare coverage begins.
services.

DELIVERY SYSTEM
A delivery system

is

a network of health care providers, covering a

specified geographic area, which provides the medical services for enrollees
in

HMOs.

DETAILING
Detailing takes place

when drug companies send representatives to
new drugs, often without

doctors' offices in an effort to encourage the use of

regard to effectiveness or cost.

DOWNGRADING
Downgrading occurs when an individuals changes his/her health
insurance policy to one that offers less comprehensive coverage.

FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLAN

A

fee-for-service plan is

hospitals

of

BC/BS

to as

a policy under which an insurer reimburses

and physicians each time an

enrollee receives care.

plans are fee-for-service plans. This type of policy

is

The majority
also referred

an indemnity plan.

GROUP PLANS
Group plans are insurance

policies offered to individuals by

way of a
Group

past or present employer or union or a member-based organization.

plans are subject to far less regulation than nongroup plans.

HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are delivery systems that
act both as insurers and providers of health care. The three types of
products available to Medicare recipients are Cost Contracts, Risk Contracts,

HMO
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and Wrap-Around Contracts (see this Glossary). All three have some
restrictions on the health care providers that an enrollee may use.

LOSS RATIOS
Loss ratios are the specified percentages of premiums that must be
dedicated to enrollee benefits. The remaining portion of the premium may
go to such things as administrative costs and company profits.

MEDEX
Medex

name

of the Medigap policies offered by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts.
is

the brand

MEDICAID PROGRAM
The Medicaid Program
program for the poor.

is

a joint federal/state health insurance

MEDICARE PROGRAM
The Medicare Program is a federal health insurance program for
people over 65 as well as certain disabled individuals.

MEDIGAP INSURANCE
Medigap insurance

is

health insurance, offered by various private

insurers, that supplements the federal Medicare Program.

NONGROUP PLANS
Nongroup plans are insurance policies negotiated directly between an
individual and an insurer. These policies are also referred to as individual
or direct-billed policies.

PRE-EXISTING CONDITION EXCLUSIONS
Pre-existing condition exclusions are practices of insurance companies

deny payment for any services related

problems that have been
treated (or simply occurred) before the coverage began. Sometimes the policy
to

to health

coverage for a particular condition indefinitely while other
policies will have a period of time (for example, a waiting period of three
months) during which the insurance company will not provide coverage for

will exclude

a pre-existing condition.

PREMIUMS
Premiums are the regular payments made by
insurance companies in exchange for their coverage.
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enrollees to health

RISK CONTRACTS
These plans are substitutes for rather than supplements to the
Medicare Program. All services must be received in the
delivery
system. (See Health Maintenance Organization.)

HMO

RISK POOL
A risk
of setting

pool forms

premium

when people are grouped together

for the

purpose

rates.

UNCOMPENSATED CARE POOL
The Uncompensated Care

Pool, part of the 1988 Universal Health
for
the free care and reduced-cost care they
hospitals
reimburses
Care law,
provide to uninsured and underinsured individuals. Funding for the pool

Individuals and families whose
incomes are below 200% of poverty are entitled to free care. Those with
incomes between 200% and 400% of poverty are entitled to partial free care.
The Uncompensated Free Care Pool is also known as the Hospital Free Care

comes from surcharges on hospital

bills.

Pool.

UNDERWRITING
Underwriting

is

the process of assessing health and cost risks for

individuals applying for insurance coverage and pricing the

premiums

accordingly.

UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE LAW
The Universal Health Care

law, passed in 1988, has brought health

The

care coverage to thousands of uninsured residents of Massachusetts.

programs of the Universal Health Care law include the
for working disabled adults and disabled children,
the Unemployed/Uninsured Program, and the Healthy Start Program for
pregnant women. The Universal Health Care law is also known as Chapter
23 and the Health Security Act.
individual

CommonHealth Program

WATTING PERIODS
Waiting periods are requirements that an insured person wait a
number of months or years after beginning an insurance policy before
services are covered by the insurance company. The practice is designed to

certain

discourage signing up for insurance only when the care

is

needed.

WRAP-AROUND CONTRACTS
These plans function much
is

received within the

like traditional

Medigap

policies.

HMO delivery system, all benefits apply.

If

care

If services

are

obtained outside the system, Medicare benefits will be covered but the
individual is responsible for deductibles and co-payments.
(See Health

Maintenance Organization.)
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